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Abstract—This paper describes a framework on how to test High
Availability capabilities of cloud architectures, particularly OpenStack.
The “Dependability Modeling Framework” which consists of a mod-
elling of the system parts, user interactions and dependencies between
them will form the basis for this test. The test procedure consists of
simulating random shutdown of system components, polling the avail-
ability of user interactions and measuring the impact of outages and
expected downtime. Outage impacts and downtime are used to rate the
underlying system architecture. The test procedure is applied on a single
node OpenStack installation in order to show validity of the test concept.
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I. INTRODUCTION
AS mobile end users and cloud service consumers we all knowthat we want our IT services to be available every time and
everywhere - 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 365 days per
year [1]. End users normally don’t understand that this requirement
is a challenge for system architects, developers and engineers who
offer the IT services. Cloud services and their dependencies must be
regularly maintained to remain stable and secure. It is noted thought
that maintenance changes may require administrator to shut down
certain components although at the same time the service should
remain available for the end user. Achieving High Availability in
a cloud environment is therefore a challenging task - mostly due to
high expectations of end users.
The Mobile Cloud Networking (MCN) [2] project is developing
a cloud service management framework which is supposed to be
run by telecommunication providers. With MCN, telecommunication
providers are able to offer cloud services to manage mobile communi-
cation services that they on their turn offer to of end users. OpenStack
is a key technology within the project and while be used to offer
Compute, Storage and Networking capabilities. Since OpenStack is
used to provide mobile communication services to end users (who
have high expectations on availability), it is desirable to provide High
Availability in OpenStack in order to make MCN more attractive to
mobile end users as well as telecommunication providers.
OpenStack is massively scalable [3] and has a large community of
supporters, but High Availability in OpenStack does not come out of
the box.
If the Mobile Cloud Networking project wants to achieve high
acceptance levels by its stakeholders, we need a cloud solution which
is both massively scalable and reliable. [4] The problem is that there
are no tests for deciding if a cloud middleware architecture is capable
to allow High Availability or not. Even if there are cloud simulators
like e. g. CloudSim [5] (which simulates Amazon EC2, Microsoft
Azure or Aneka clouds), there is simply no availability measurement
procedure which is practicable for open source cloud environments.
Therefore we developed a general framework on how to test High
Availability in e. g. OpenStack.
II. HIGH AVAILABILITY
A. Definition of “High Availability”
Before we can try to derive a framework on evaluation of High
Availability criteria, we must first define what we mean by the term
“Availability”. According to the ITIL V3 Glossary “Availability” is the
“Ability of a Configuration Item or IT Service to perform its agreed
Function when required.” [6] In OpenStack (or a cloud service in
general) this means, that the cloud service should be usable by the
cloud users whenever they need it.
Availability is usually measured [8] as:
Availability =
(Service T ime−Downtime) ∗ 100
Service T ime
(1)
When we speak of “High Availability”, we usually mean that
the “Carrier Grade Standard”: [7] the measured availability is above
99.999 %.
B. What influences Availability?
The main reason for a system to become unavailable are component
failures. The root cause can be bad configuration files, programming
errors or bugs. A component failure is more likely to occur in complex
than in simple systems. [9] Therefore complexity generally decreases
availability.
In order to overcome outages and component failures, one can imple-
ment redundant components and failover mechanisms. Redundancy is
supposed to increase availability. [11]
But there is a caveat to that: Basically availability can be increased
by adding redundant components. On the other hand, every new
component makes the overall system more complex and therefore
increases the risk of component failures. [11]
In short: availability levels depend on a trade off between adding
redundant system components and introducing additional complexity
(and possible points of failure) to the overall architecture.
For the OpenStack environment this means one has to define the
level of redundancy of different OpenStack components and test if
the complexity of the introduced High Availability technologies do
not decrease availability of the cloud service.
C. High Availability in OpenStack
OpenStack consists of many different services. The main service
for managing hypervisors and running VM instances is called “Nova”.
The “Glance” service is responsible for management of Virtual
Machine images and the “Cinder” service is responsible for the
management of virtual hard disks (called volumes). Other important
components are the “Swift” object storage service and the “Quantum”
network service. Identity Management and authentication is per-
formed by the “Keystone” service. OpenStack offers a web dashboard
which is implemented by the “Horizon” service. The dashboard also
depends on a web server like e. g. the Apache web server. All
OpenStack services need a database management system like e. g.
MySQL to operate correctly. Communication between components is
managed by an AMQP based messaging service.
All the OpenStack services must be tested for their capability to
deliver highly available cloud services.
D. How can we test High Availability capabilities?
In order to find out if an architecture is able to deliver availability
levels above 99,999%, we must build an implementation of the tested
system (following the architecture plans) and then simulate random
outages under realistic conditions. The approach is to implement
an OpenStack installation, let some components experience failures
and then check if the service becomes unavailable. [1]
The simulation alone does not tell anything about the expected
availability level a system architecture is able to deliver. If we want
to know which architecture is the most suitable to be deployed as a
High Availability system, we must rate the different architectures
and make them comparable to each other. We chose to rate system
architectures according to the expected downtime and the severity of
outages during the simulation run. This rating was chosen, because
we want to reflect outage costs. Outage costs depend on downtime
as well as the importance of the unavailable service to the user. [10]
III. DEPENDABILITY MODELING FRAMEWORK
A. Setup of the simulation
If we want to know how to rate a system like OpenStack in terms
of availability, we must first know what we want to measure and how
we should measure it. We already explained that we want to rate
system architectures according to downtime and impact of outages.
While downtime is something which can be observed directly in a
simulation, the impact of outages must first be operationalized (turned
into an ordinal variable) to be measured.
A good way to achieve this operationalization is the “Dependability
Modeling Framework”. [12] In this framework, an outage impact is
rated according to its impact for the end user. The framework is
about creating a list of use cases (which are the agreed functions end
users expect from an IT service) and linking the use cases to system
functions, services and components. An outage of a component can
then be seen as an event that makes all use cases it is linked to
unavailable. The impact of an outage could be modeled as the sum
of use cases which become unavailable after an outage. Of course
one could also give some use cases more weight than other use cases
depending on their importance for the end user. The test framework
is created in three steps:
1) Create a model of common use cases for a cloud operating
system and their links to system components (whereby the
links represent dependencies between user tasks and system
parts).
2) then test cloud software (according to some architectural
plan) and simulate outages of the components that are
mentioned in the model.
3) finally measure the impact of an outage by executing
the list of use cases from the model. Thereby we say
that the impact is the sum of (weighted) use cases which
became unavailable and the downtime is equal to a (previously
defined) average recovery time.
B. Construction of the Model
The idea of this paper is to construct a “Dependability Model”
of a cloud middleware in order to create a general test framework
for cloud architectures. The “Dependability Model” is a model of
use cases that are linked to system components they depend on.
The model is constructed following the “Dependability Modeling
Framework” approach. The “Dependability Modeling Framework” is
a hierarchical modeling framework for dependability evaluation of
system architectures. [12] Its purpose is to model different alternative
architectural solutions for one IT system and then calculate the
dependability characteristics of each different IT system realization.
The calculated dependability values can help IT architects to rate
system architectures before they are implemented and to choose the
“best” approach from different possible alternatives. Design decisions
which are based on the “Dependability Modeling Framework” have
the potential to be more reflective and less biased than purely intuitive
design decisions, since no particular architectural design is preferred
to others. The fit of a particular solution is tested versus previously
defined criteria before any decision is taken. Dependability models
have four levels:
1) the user level,
2) the function level,
3) the service level and
4) the resource level.
In contrast to other models which emphasize the aspect of complex
dependencies between system components, dependability models
delineate outages as events which are perceivable by end users. [13]
Dependability models are constructed by identifying user cases or
user interactions and then finding system functions, services and
components which provide them. Once all system parts are found,
the provision of use cases is modelled as links which show the
dependability of user interactions on system components.
The dependability model levels reflect this method. All user inter-
actions, system functions, services and resources (components) are
identified first. Afterwards the models are built by linking all of the
four levels to each other. With dependability models it is possible to
assess the impact of component failures on the quality of the service
delivered to end users. Dependability models are made visible either
in a dependency table or in a dependency graph to show the different
dependencies between user interactions, system functions, services
and system resources.
The building of dependability models is a manual process. But once
all dependencies are modelled correctly, the impact of a system
resource outage to user functions can be calculated: if a resource
fails, all dependent services, functions and user interactions must fail
too.
C. Dependency graph and dependency table
The dependency graph in [Fig. 1] demonstrates how end user
interactions depend on functions, services and resources. The graph
consists of 4 rows which represent the model levels: user interactions,
system functions, system services and system components. Elements
of each level are connected to elements of nearby levels by 1:N
relations from top to bottom (whereby the connections represent
dependencies).
FIG. 1: Dependency Graph.
The construction of such a dependency graph is done by first
creating a dependency table (see [Fig. 2]). The graph consists
in system requirements, use cases (user interactions), functions,
services and components. As a first step a list of requirements for
the modeled system is created and filled in the first column. Then
for each element in the first column the user interactions that are
needed to fulfill the requirement are drawn in the second column.
Once the second column is filled up, all system functions that enable
user interactions the second column are drawn in the third column.
The same procedure is repeated recursively on the system functions,
system services and components.
FIG. 2: Dependency table construction.
Once the dependency table is finished the dependency graph can
be derived by transferring all elements of the table in a graph. Each
cell in the table represents a node in the dependency graph. Nodes
are never drawn multiple times. Each row shows a path from one
user interaction to one function, one service and one component.
This path is represented as sequence of arrows which connect the
nodes. Each arrow must be drawn iteratively until all rows of the
table are represented in the dependency graph. The result is a model
of system components and user interactions which depend on the
system components (see [Fig. 3]).
D. Simulation of outages
Outages can be simulated by using a tool that shuts down the
components listed in the dependency graph. One such tool is the
“Chaos Monkey” [14] from Netflix, which is able to randomly shut
down IT services. This random shutdown is called an “attack”.
In order to observe occurence of attacks one should define an
observation time frame. For reasons of practicality we assume the
observation time frame to be equal to one day, because we are
interested in outages, not small failures which make the user perceive
performance degradations only.
For the simulation of outages we could use something similar to a
“Chaos Monkey”, e. g. a Python script which attacks the components
of the cloud operating system that we want to test. If we want
outages to occur in a realistic setup we must assign probabilities to
the component attacks. Realistic outage probabilities of components
could only be obtained by regularly measuring downtime of the
commercially available components over a long time frame and
assume that we will achieve the same downtime probabilities for
the components we use. Since there is no such data available, one
must estimate the outage probabilities and use this estimation as the
parameter we want to use for the probability of attacks.
FIG. 3: Dependency Graph Construction.
Basically the probability of an outage in a given observation
time frame depends on the observed time frame, the steady state
availability of the component and the average recovery time needed
for repairing the system component. [15] The mathematical formula
for the outage probability is:
Outage Probability =
(100− Steady State Avail.) ∗Obs. T ime Frame
Avg. Recovery T ime
(2)
If we assign steady state availabilities and average recovery times
to each component listed in the dependability graph, we can derive
the probabilities for the attacks we run in the simulation. If we e. g.
assume that component A is observed for one day (=86’400 seconds),
has a steady state availability of 90 % and an average recovery time
of one hour (=3’600 seconds), the outage risk per day is 0.6 %. We
can then programmatically advise the script to attack component A
with a probability of 0.6 % in order to simulate an accidental outage
of the component.
E. Measurement of downtime and outage impacts
The simulation should not only run attacks on the components, but
also register outages and measure their impact. In order to measure
downtime, we could use a program that checks availability of system
components. For this reason we must poll the tested system for
availability of the user interactions we are interested in. Again this
can be done programmatically by using e. g. a Python script that
runs the user interactions and check if they can be performed without
errors. If any error occurs, it can be assumed that there is an outage.
In order to give outage impact and downtime suffered a mathematical
value, we must enhance our dependency table. This can be done by
adding three columns to the dependency table: one for the “weight
factors” or importance we want to assign to each use case, one for the
average recovery time of each component and one for the downtime
suffered in case of an outage (see [Fig. 4]). The weight factor reflects
the importance we assign to each use case. In our test framework,
we assign each use case a weight factor between 1 and 3, whereby
1 is the least important factor and 3 the most important one. The
average recovery time is assigned to each component and is a value of
several seconds. The expected downtime is then assigned to each use
case. The downtime is assumed to be the maximum average recovery
time of all components involved in one single use case, because all
components which are involved in the outage must be recovered. For
example, if components A and B are depend on use case C and A
has a larger average recovery time than B, the downtime suffered for
C is equal to the average recovery time of A. For this calculation we
assume that in case of an outage, a system administrator must run
failover mechanisms for all components that might cause the outage
of the unavailable user task. Therefore the average recovery time of
the use case outage cannot be shorter than the average recovery time
of one of the components involved. In short: the expected downtime
is equal to the “Mean Time To Recovery” (MTTR). [16]
FIG. 4: Assignment of weight factors.
Once the dependency table is enhanced it can be used for the
calculation of outage impacts and downtime suffered: every time
when the test script discovers an outage, it adds the weight factor
to an impact outage variable and the suffered downtime to a total
downtime variable. The outage impact of a test run is the sum of
weight factors of all unavailable use cases and the suffered downtime
is the sum of all downtimes discovered.
IV. THE SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
Once the dependency table and the table with outage probabilities
are created, a simulation of outages can be run by using the Python
scripts to attack the system components and the script to poll
downtime and outage impacts. A test run is performed in 4 steps:
1) Run the attack
2) Poll the system to find out what impact the attack had on the
system.
3) Collect the outage impact and downtime values and store them
as one set of data in a test database.
4) Restore the initial state of the system and prepare it for further
test runs.
A simulation should consist of multiple test runs. Since we defined
a test run as a possible “attack” running once a day, we could try to
simulate the full life cycle of the system.
We did not yet define which data we want to collect besides outage
impact and downtime. In the section about High Availability we
argued that redundancy increases availability and complexity reduces
availability in general. Therefore we want to measure the influence
of redundancy and complexity on the availability of OpenStack.
Therefore we must collect data on the number of redundant system
nodes, clustering technology (if clustering technology is used) as well
as details on the node configuration. The goal of the simulation should
be to find a system architecture which provides the least downtime
and impact of component failures.
V. IMPLEMENTATION IN OPENSTACK
The “Dependability Modeling Framework” does not evalutate
which cloud is “better” in providing high availability levels than
another one. The dependability model links user interactions or use
cases to system components. Since use cases are made for concrete
system implementations, we must first have a list of use cases in order
to establish a dependability model. Therefore the “Dependability
Modeling Framework” is rather a measurement procedure for a
concrete implementation of a system architecture than a generalizable
test.
If we want to test OpenStack for its aptitude to deliver highly available
cloud services using the “Dependability Modeling Framework”, we
must take a concrete OpenStack implementation as test object.
A. Architectural aspects of the Mobile Cloud Network
The MCN architecture uses all known OpenStack services, like e.
g. “Nova” and “Cinder”. Furthermore it is supposed to run on the
infrastructure of telecommunication providers and uses OpenStack to
create virtual machines which perform tasks like routing of mobile
data traffic. MCN exploits scalability of OpenStack in order to make
the infrastructure of telecommunication companies more reliable.
In order to keep it simple, we can say that the MCN architecture can
be divided in the following component groups:
• Hardware like e. g. physical server nodes, network cables etc.
which are wired to each other.
• Operating systems which run on the physical server nodes.
• OpenStack cloud services running on top of each operating
system. They provide the virtualization of the telecommunica-
tion infrastructure.
• Virtual machines and virtual devices which run on top of
OpenStack and themselves hosts the telecommunication ser-
vices to mobile end users (customers of the telecommunication
providers).
Each component of the MCN architecture is then part of one of the
groups. It can be assumed then that a MCN node consists in hardware,
an operating system, OpenStack (and its services) and a virtual
machine, which hosts telecommunication services. For construction
of the dependency graph and dependency table we must know which
user interactions/use cases are performed on the concrete OpenStack
implementation (the MCN).
B. MCN User Interactions and OpenStack
In order to create the dependency table of the OpenStack architec-
ture, we must define which typical user tasks are expected to happen
in the cloud. A source for this information could be a list of typical
use cases for cloud computing. Just like any list of use cases, the list
of cloud computing use cases is derived from user requirements. In
order to produce the list of user requirements, we took a white paper
on cloud computing use cases [17] as our source for requirements.
As a cloud-based platform, MCN implements such use cases which
are common to all cloud services. According to the white paper the
MCN suffices the following requirements: it must offer (federated)
Identity Management for end users as well as cloud administra-
tors. The cloud must be accessible by using an “open”, platform-
independent client. It must provide metering and monitoring of
end user activities, measure SLAs, benchmarks of the provided
infrastrucutre and manage the lifecycle of the infrastructure. The
MCN should be aware of end user locations. The MCN cloud should
manage access and security policies and provide governance. Virtual
machines should have a common file format and be accessible through
a common API. All data used by the MCN should be managed in a
federated database.
The OpenStack software used in MCN suffices all common cloud
requirements. [17] [Tab. I] shows the requirements and use cases
which depend on the requirements. There is also a list of components
used in the MCN architecture which are mainly responsible for
enabling the user interactions.
TABLE I: Requirements to the MCN, dependent use cases and responsible
components.
Requirement Use Case/Interaction Resp. Component
Identity Management Update Telco Account VM
Openclient Login to Dashboard Horizon
Federated Identity Management Update OpenStack Account Keystone
Manage Keypairs Keystone
Location Awareness Get End User Location VM
Metering and Monitoring Meter Usage of Telco Service Provisioning
Monitor VM and Infrastructure Ceilometer
Management and Governance Update Policies Keystone
Security Telco Authenticate VM
Telco Connect VM
VM Admin Authenticate Keystone, VM
Common File Format Update VM/Instances Nova
Common API Update Images Glance
Update Volumes Cinder
Update Storage Swift
Update Networks Quantum
Data Application and Federation Collect Data MySQL
SLAs and Benchmarks Measure SLAs Provisioning
Lifecycle Management Manage Lifecycle Nova
Starting with this table it is easy to proceed in creating the
dependency table: we must only add all responsible components
which enable availability of an use case/user interaction to the first
table. The dependency table of the MCN is shown in [Tab. II]. [Tab.
II] includes three additional columns, so called “Assignments”. The
assignments are:
1) the weight of the outage impact when the corresponding use
case or user interaction becomes unavailable,
2) the average recovery time when the corresponding compo-
nent becomes unavailable and
3) the expected downtime when the linked user interaction is
interrupted.
These three columns are very important for rating an OpenStack
architecture: when a component failure is detected, the outage impact
and the expected downtime are added to an impact and a downtime
variable. The sum of impact values and the sum of expected downtime
are metrics that actually measure the High Availability characteristics
of the architecture. Ideally both values should be as low as possible.
TABLE II: Dependency table of the MCN.
Assignments
(r)3-5 Use Case Resp. Component Weight Avg. Rec. Time Exp. Downtime
Update Telco Account Operating System of VM 3 1’200 1’200
User DB 3 1’200 1’200
SSH/Password Management of VM 3 1’200 1’200
Password DB 3 1’200 1’200
Login to Dashboard Horizon 1 1’200 1’200
Apache 1 1’200 1’200
Keystone 1 1’200 1’200
MySQL 1 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 1 1’200 1’200
Update OpenStack Account Keystone 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
Manage Keypairs Horizon 3 1’200 1’200
Apache 1 1’200 1’200
Keystone 1 1’200 1’200
MySQL 1 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 1 1’200 1’200
Get End User Location Mobile Node Detection in VM 2 1’200 1’200
Meter Usage of Telco Service Ceilometer 3 1’200 1’200
VM Plugin 3 1’200 1’200
Monitor VM and Infrastructure Ceilometer 3 1’200 1’200
VM Plugin 3 1’200 1’200
Update Policies Keystone 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
Telco Authenticate SSH/Password Management of VM 3 1’200 1’200
Password DB 3 1’200 1’200
Telco Connect Connection Management of VM 3 1’200 1’200
Connection DB 3 1’200 1’200
VM Admin Authenticate SSH/Password Management of VM 3 1’200 1’200
Password DB 3 1’200 1’200
Keystone 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
Update VM/Instances Nova 2 1’200 1’200
Glance 2 1’200 1’200
Cinder 2 1’200 1’200
Swift 2 1’200 1’200
MySQL 2 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 2 1’200 1’200
Update Images Glance 2 1’200 1’200
MySQL 2 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 2 1’200 1’200
Update Volumes Cinder 2 1’200 1’200
MySQL 2 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 2 1’200 1’200
Update Storage Swift 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
Update Networks Quantum 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
Collect Data MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
Measure SLAs Ceilometer 2 1’200 1’200
VM Plugin 2 1’200 1’200
Manage Lifecycle Nova 3 1’200 1’200
MySQL 3 1’200 1’200
RabbitMQ 3 1’200 1’200
All OpenStack OS 49 600 600
All OpenStack HW 49 600 600
The assumption in [Tab. II] is that the operating system and the
hardware of a node have expected downtimes of 10 min. (= 600
seconds). All other components have downtimes of 20 min. (=1’200
seconds).
We have also labelled two rows with the use case “All”. These
rows are meant for the case that a hardware or operating system
failure occurs in a physical node which runs OpenStack. In case of
such a failure the OpenStack software, all virtual machines (which
are managed by OpenStack) and all user services provided by them
become unavailable. Just like any other software, OpenStack becomes
unavailable if the underlying physical node fails. We have given
the case of such a node failure the weight of 49 which equals the
cumulated weight of all use cases/interactions provided by the MCN,
because failure of physical systems means an outage of all use cases
at once.
C. Setup of OpenStack simulation
With the dependency table we can start a simulation of the
OpenStack architecture. The simulation consists in multiple test runs.
A test run is performed in four steps:
1) Setup an OpenStack environment following the architecture
we want to test for its High Availability capabilities. It is better
to use an automated installation mechanism (like e. g. the
OpenStack Automation [18] we use at the ICCLab) in order to
automate the test run than to install and configure OpenStack
manually. Test automation reduces the costs of testing and
offers a higher coverage of fault detection. [19]
2) Run a program that randomly disables the OpenStack services
which are listed in the dependency table (like e. g. Nova,
Keystone or Glance). The shutdown should not be completely
random: it should be performed with a certain probability that
reflects the expected availability levels and average recovery
times of the OpenStack components. For example, if we
expect the Keystone component to achieve an availability
of 99.9 % and assume that the average recovery time of a
Keystone outage is 20 minutes (= 1’200 seconds) and want to
know the outage probability for one day (=86’400 seconds):
we get the probability p = ((100 - 99.9) x 86’400) / 1’200
= 7.2 %. The shutdown program should disable the Keystone
service with a probability of 7.2 %. An example of such a
probability estimation is shown in [Tab.III].
3) Poll the available user interactions which are listed in the de-
pendency table. This can be performed by running functional
tests which simulate an user interaction. If the unit test fails,
the weight of the use case in the dependency graph should be
added to an impact variable. The assigned downtime should
be summed to a downtime variable.
4) Collect the results and clean the environment. All services
which were disabled in step (2) must be restarted. The initial
state of the system should be restored. If there were outages
discovered in step (2) the impact and downtime values should
be stored in a database.
Steps (1-4) should be seen as one test run which simulates availability
of OpenStack components in one day. By repeatedly performing the
test run, one could (theoretically) collect data which represents the
whole life time of the OpenStack service.
TABLE III: Estimation of outage probabilities for the MCN components.
Component Availability Avg. Recovery Outage Risk
Level Time per Day
Hardware of OpenStack installation 99.99999 % 600 0.00144 %
OS of OpenStack installation 99.99999 % 600 0.00144 %
Apache 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
Ceilometer 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
Cinder 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
VM internal Connection DB 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
VM internal Connection Management 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
Glance 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
Horizon 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
Keystone 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
VM internal Node Location Detection 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
MySQL 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
Nova 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
VM internal Operating System 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
VM internal Password DB 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
Quantum 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
RabbitMQ 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
VM internal Password Management 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
Swift 99.9 % 1’200 7.2 %
VM internal User DB 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
VM internal Ceilometer Plugin 99.8 % 1’200 14.4 %
TABLE IV: Test results of single node MCN OpenStack architecture.
Results
(r)3-5 Simulation Nbr. of Total Total Measured
Run Test-Runs Downtime Impact Availability
001 90 112’800 572 98.54938 %
002 90 262’800 1’554 96.62037 %
003 90 192’000 1’208 97.53086 %
004 90 187’200 984 97.59259 %
005 90 120’000 704 98.45679 %
006 90 198’000 1’182 97.45370 %
007 90 162’000 930 97.91667 %
008 90 276’000 1’660 96.45062 %
009 90 337’200 1’966 95.66358 %
010 90 118’800 546 98.47222 %
011 90 171’600 970 97.79321 %
012 90 129’600 744 98.33333 %
013 90 146’400 916 98.11728 %
014 90 93’600 492 98.79630 %
015 90 175’200 1’036 97.74691 %
016 90 213’600 1’196 97.25309 %
Average: 181’500 1’041 97.67168 %
Std.Dev.: 64’142 401 0.82488 %
VI. EVALUATION IN OPENSTACK
The model was evaluated on a single node OpenStack Grizzly
installation (all MCN components were installed on a single virtual
machine). The installation was performed using Vagrant [20] and
Puppet [21]. We simulated 3 months of service operation, which
means that 90 test runs had to be accomplished. As simulation input
we took the dependency table in [Tab. II] and the outage probabilities
of [Tab. III]. There were 15 simulations performed. [Tab. IV] shows
the results of the evaluation.
It is not a very surprising result that a single node non-redundant
OpenStack architecture (which does not cluster its cloud services)
suffers downtime and has a rather low availability - especially when
we assume that we use components that operate below the “Five
Nines” availability (as defined in section II-A). The outage impact
values are rather high. The impact values are good benchmarks for
clustered OpenStack architectures: any High Availability technology
which is used in combination with OpenStack must be smaller than
the outage impact values measured in [Tab. IV].
Although the evaluation has not been performed yet on clustered
cloud services, the evaluation serves as a proof for the validity of
the dependability modeling concept as a best practice method for
measuring High Availability capabilities of cloud architectures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we wanted to describe a test method which is able
to test “High Availability” capabilities of cloud solutions like e. g.
OpenStack. From our perspective “High Availability” means that the
availability (i. e. the ratio between uptime and operating time of an
IT system) is higher than 99.999 %. We have defined availability as
the ability of an IT system to execute tasks which are required by
service consumers. When the service consumer or end user can not
perform agreed user interactions, the IT system suffers downtime and
the availability gets reduced. Following this definition we created a
test procedure which links the abilities of system components to use
cases. We found that the “Dependability Modeling Framework” is a
good approach to model dependencies between system components,
services, functions and user interactions, because it shows the relation
between IT system components and tasks of service consumers in a
dependency table and dependency graph. We described a simulation
which uses the dependability model in order to test HA capabilities
of system architectures. The simulation consisted of several test runs
which simulated random shutdown of system components. (Whereby
this “randomness” follows previously defined outage probabilities
which reflect availability levels of the components used in the system
architecture.) After each shutdown, it was tested if the required user
interactions were still available. In case of an outage, the impact of the
outage was measured as a score value which reflects the importance of
the failed user interaction. Each user interaction had also an expected
downtime which was assigned to it. In case of failure this downtime
was registered too. The total impact and total downtime of all outages
was collected during the simulation. They served as a rating for the
High Availability capabilities of the system architecture. This test
procedure serves as an approach to test system architectures in terms
of meeting High Availability criteria.
In order to prove the validity of the concept we created a dependability
model of the OpenStack architecture used in the Mobile Cloud
Network project. We assigned outage impact weights and downtimes
to typical MCN use cases. We assigned outage probabilities to the
components used in the MCN OpenStack environment and performed
a simulation of outages for a single node OpenStack architecture. As
a result we measured that a non-clustered OpenStack architecture
does not offer high availability values. We also showed that our test
framework makes High Availability capabilities of cloud architectures
measurable.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
While we have described the theoretical framework on how to test
High Availability capabilities simple deplyoments of OpenStack, we
still must run the tests on different OpenStack architectures. There are
a number of High Availability technologies which could be used in an
OpenStack environment: one could e. g. run OpenStack on redundant
block storage disks by using DRBD [22] technology, or one could use
scalable clustering technologies like Ceph [23] to make the OpenStack
components available redundantly. Another important part are failover
systems like e. g. Pacemaker. [24] Some failover technologies work
very reliably, others do not. The important part to be done is to
collect empirical data and find out if there are correlations between the
underlying clustering and failover technology, the number of cluster
nodes and the measured outage severity. This work still has to be
done and the results will be presented in another paper.
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